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INTRODUCTION

This Article briefly compares the nature and content of polar fisheries
regimes. It examines the content of selected international legal structures
pertaining to fisheries within the polar and sub-polar seas, and then draws
conclusions from the similarities and differences in approach to common
problems.
Before considering the international regimes pertaining to marine living
resources in the Arctic and Antarctic, it is necessary to justify that such a
comparison is a valid and worthwhile exercise. A number of eminent
publicists have suggested that to compare the polar regions is a misconceived
exercise, and at anything beyond the most superficial level such an analysis
is pointless.' Clearly, these views need to be answered if the present article
is to have any claim to credibility, and so some careful evaluation of them is
needed.
At a superficial level, the similarities between the two poles are relatively
obvious. Both are remote from the larger centers of human activity and
development; both are possessed of fragile ecological systems, with relatively
short and concentrated food chains; both are subject to extreme weather
conditions, and unique conditions in terms of the length of night and day
throughout the year; both have large areas covered by ice for extended
periods. At one level, such similarities appear to justify the pertinence of a
comparison between the two regions.
The forceful response to this is voiced by Franckx, Boyle, Young and
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Professor David VanderZwaag for his comments on this paper, Dr. Marcus Haward for his
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1. Such a view is not universally held. See, e.g., Peter J. Beck, Entering the Age of the
Polar Regions: The Arctic and Antarctic are No Longer Poles Apart, 18 AMBIO 92 (1989);
Donald R. Rothwell & Stuart Kaye, Law of the Sea and the Polar Regions: Reconsidering the
TraditionalNorms, 18 MARINE POL'Y 41 (1994); Finn Sollie, PolarPolitics: Old Games in New
Territories,or New Patterns in PoliticalDevelopment?, 39 INT'L J. 695 (1984).
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Osherenko, among others.2 Individually, they focus on a number of differences that diminish the effectiveness of comparing the poles. First, and most
obvious are the geographical differences. The Arctic is essentially a frozen
ocean surrounded by continents, whereas the Antarctic is a frozen continent
surrounded by oceans. As a result, there are clear and distinct differences in
the climate and habitats of the polar regions. The Antarctic, with its vast ice
sheet, is generally far colder than the Arctic, and is subject to more severe
weather conditions more often.3 The dynamics of the oceanic ice coverage
is also very different, with the sea ice in the Antarctic pulsating back and
forth each year from twenty million square kilometers in winter to four
million square kilometers in summer.4 The variations in Arctic sea ice are
far less dramatic, ranging from ten million square kilometers in winter to
eight million square kilometers in summer.5
A second difference relates to the great political differences between the
two regions. The Antarctic has, certainly since the signing of the Antarctic
Treaty in 1959,6 been a political vacuum. By virtue of Article IV of the
Antarctic Treaty, the claims of various states to Antarctic territory have been
Scientific cooperation is expressly encouraged, scientific data
"frozen."
collected is exchanged and the degree of international goodwill and concord
Both the testing
between the states present on the continent is remarkable
of nuclear weapons and the storage of radioactive waste are expressly
prohibited,' as are military activities and the establishment of bases.9 In
contrast, the Arctic was a major theater of operations during the Cold War.
From the 1950s, the United States and Canada maintained the DEW line at
700 North to prevent Soviet incursions into North American airspace.'" In

2. See, e.g., Oran R. Young, 'Arctic Waters': The Politics of Regime Formation, 18 OCEAN
DEV. & INT'L L. 101 (1987); GAIL OSHERENKO & ORAN R. YOUNG, THE AGE OF THE ARCTIC:
HOT CONFLICTS AND COLD REALITIES 242-44 (1989); ERIK FRANCKX, MARITIME CLAIMS IN THE
ARCTIC: CANADIAN AND RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVES 6-8 (1993) [hereinafter FRANCKX, MARITIME

CLAIMS]; Erik Franckx, Environmental Protection: An Arctic-Antarctic Comparison, in THE
ANTARCTIC ENVIRONMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 109 (Joe Verhoeven et at. eds., 1992)
[hereinafter Franckx, Environmental Protection];Alan E. Boyle, Remarks on Legal Regimes of
the Arctic, 82 PRoC. AM. SOC. INT'L L. 323 (1988).
3. FRANCKX, MARITIME CLAIMS, supra note 2, at 6.
4. CHRISTOPHER C. JOYNER, ANTARCTICA AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 15-16 (1992).
5. R.G. Barry, The Present Climate of the Arctic Ocean and Possible Past and Future
States, in THE ARCTIC SEAS I (Yvonne Herman ed., 1989); Louis Rey, The Arctic Ocean: A
'Polar Mediterranean,' in THE ARCTIC OCEAN: THE HYDROGRAPHIC ENVIRONMENT AND THE

FATE OF POLLUTANTS 3, 34 (Louis Rey ed., 1982).
6. The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
7. Id. arts. I-III. For an example of conviviality and cooperation during the height of the
cold war cf. KEITH SUTER, ANTARCTICA:

PRIVATE PROPERTY OR PUBLIC HERITAGE? 24-25

(1991).
8. The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 6, art. V.
9. Id. art. 1.
10. The Distant Early Warning, or DEW, line was constructed and jointly operated by
Canada and the United States, commencing operation in 1957. 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 43
(Int'l ed. 1991).
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more recent times, the two superpowers maintained fleets of nuclear-powered
submarines that could operate beneath the Arctic ice. The then-USSR
maintained a huge military establishment on the Kola Peninsula." Rather
than a demilitarized region, free of conventional and nuclear forces, the
Arctic was a vital strategic area, where both powers deployed nuclear
forces. '2
A third difference is the level of human activity in the two regions. The
Antarctic is devoid of any indigenous population, and has no truly permanent
population. Settlements of scientists and support staff, who are usually
stationed on a base for no more than eighteen months at a time, are
irregularly scattered around the continent. 3 No industry, save for irregular
tourist visits, takes place on shore. 4 In contrast, the Arctic possesses a
significant collection of indigenous communities who do not merely live
permanently in the region, but can trace such presence back to prehistoric
times.' 5 Further, the Arctic is the site of considerable industrial activity,
notably on the Kola 16Peninsula (particularly in Murmansk), and on oil fields
of the Beaufort Sea.

The arguments are all persuasive and have some weight. Certainly the
different geopolitical backgrounds of the two regions have impacted on the
nature and scope of the international regimes that have formed in each of
them. The influence and impact of an epistemic community 7 of scientists
on policy in the Antarctic has not been duplicated in the Arctic. All these
factors raise questions as to whether comparison is fruitful. However, it is
submitted that comparison in this context is a valid exercise for the following
reasons.
First, what is under consideration here are fisheries regimes in the

circumpolar seas. Both the Antarctic and the Arctic possess substantial stocks
of marine living resources that flourish in the sub-Arctic and sub-Antarctic
waters. The ecosystems in these areas are similar, being relatively narrow
11. Willy Ostreng, The Geostrategic Conditions of Deterrence in the Barents Sea, in THE
SOVIET MARITIME ARCTIC 201 (Lawson W. Brigham ed., 1991).
12. OSHERENKO & YOUNG, supra note 2, at 17-44, 243; see generally W. Harriet Critchley,

Polar Deployment of Soviet Submarines, 39 INT'L J. 828 (1984).
13.

For a list of over-wintering bases in the Antarctic see 30 POLAR RECORD 78 (1994).

14. Rising levels of tourism, however, have led to concerns that environmental safeguards
for tourist activities ought to be implemented. For example, see Antarctic Treaty Consultative
Party Meeting Recommendation XVI- 13 entitled Tourism and Non-Government Activities in the
Antarctic Treaty Area, reprinted in W.M. BUSH, 2 ANTARCTICA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW,

Booklet AT91G 88-90 (1994).
15. These include the Inuit, the Aleut, the Sami, the groups of northern Russia associated
under the Association of Small Peoples of the North.
16. OSHERENKO & YOUNG, supra note 2, at 45-71; Franklyn Griffiths, The Arctic in the

Russian Identity, in THE SOVIET MARITIME ARCTIC 83, 83-90 (Lawson W. Brigham ed., 1991).
17. For discussions on the nature and influence of epistemic communities on regime
formation and international relations see generally Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic
Communities and InternationalPolicy Coordination,46 INT'L ORG. 1 (1992); James K. Sebenius,
Challenging Conventional Explanations of InternationalCooperation:Negotiation Analysis and
the Case of Epistemic Communities, 46 INT'L ORG. 323 (1992).
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and highly concentrated in a few key species.' 8 These key species are the
subject of substantial exploitation. 9 The degree of vulnerability of these
ecosystems is not duplicated in the same fashion elsewhere in the world,2"
and accordingly, comparing approaches to the management and conservation
of these stocks may prove worthwhile.
The political gulf between the two poles is also beginning to narrow.
Relations between East and West have dramatically improved with the end
of the Soviet Union, and consequently, commitment to the Arctic as a major
theater of confrontation has somewhat waned. This can be charted by recent
moves toward the establishment of a wide ranging environmental regime for
the Arctic. 2 Whereas in the past, the Arctic States 22 had shown little
interest in pursuing such objectives, there now appears to be a genuine
commitment to the achievement of some level of regional cooperation. While
this cooperative interest has not extended to fisheries, the change in atmosphere means that a greater range of negotiable solutions to fisheries problems
are possible. 23 Different approaches might now be acceptable, and accordingly comparison is not beset with the pointlessness such an activity would
have encountered a decade ago.
Finally, the issue of indigenous exploitation of fisheries does make the
Arctic fundamentally different from the Antarctic. However, the level of
indigenous exploitation of most species does not approach the level of the
commercial harvest. 24 Where indigenous people target endangered species
they have traditionally hunted, the ultimate reason for the species' precarious
state may be due to commercial harvesting at an earlier time. Effective
18. See generally M.J. Dunbar, Arctic Marine Ecosystems, in THE ARCTIC OCEAN: THE

233 (Louis Rey ed., 1982);
George A. Knox, The Living Resources of the Southern Ocean: A Scientific Overview, in
HYDROGRAPHIC ENVIRONMENT AND THE FATE OF POLLUTANTS

ANTARCTIC RESOURCES POLICY: SCIENTIFIC, LEGAL AND POLITICAL ISSUES 21 (Francisco Orrego

Vicufla, ed., 1983).
19. The species concerned in the present discussion are krill in the Antarctic, and pollock
in the Bering Sea.
20. For example, see R. Margalef, Ecosystem Diversity Differences: Poles and Tropics, in
POLAR OCEANS 367 (M.J. Dunbar ed., 1977).
21. See Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, June 14, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1624 (1991).
For other recent developments in this area see Donald R. Rothwell, International Law and
Protection of the Arctic Environment, 44 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 280 (1995); David D. Caron,
Toward an Arctic Environmental Regime, 24 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 377 (1993).

22. The parties to the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy are the United States,
Canada, Denmark (on behalf of Greenland), Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Russia.
23. Things may even be beginning to change. Note the continuing negotiations between
Norway, Russia and Iceland over the Barents Sea "loophole" in Oslo in April 1995. Interview
with L. Skalova, Russian Committee on Fisheries (May 4, 1995). See generally Evelyne Meltzer,
Global Overview of Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks: The Non-Sustainable Nature
of High Seas Fisheries, 25 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 255, 279-281 (1994) (discussing the
"loophole").
24. This issue is discussed in Nancy C. Doubleday, Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling: The
Right of Inuit to Hunt Whales and the Implicationsfor International Environmental Law, 17
DENVER J. INT'L & POL'Y 373 (1989); Michael L. Chiropolos, Inupiat Subsistence and the

Bowhead Whale: Can Indigenous Hunting Cultures Coexist with EndangeredAnimal Species?,
5 COLO. J. INT'L ENV. L. & POL'Y 213 (1994).
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management of fisheries is needed to control and limit commercial fishing,
and this is true in both regions. 5 As such, comparing different approaches
to effective management, and evaluating the results of such management is
useful.
In order to facilitate the comparison, this Article makes two case studies.
This will permit a greater level of detail than would otherwise be possible if
all the regimes of the Arctic and Antarctic were examined. A more complete
examination of a number of international instruments and arrangements is
being undertaken as part of a larger work currently in preparation. The two
case studies considered here are both significant and representative of the
broader approaches to marine living resource management in the polar regions
and should provide an effective context for this comparative analysis.
I. THE ANTARCTIC

A. Background
Since the Antarctic Treaty was concluded in 1959, a complex set of
instruments, including conventions and recommendations arising from
international meetings has grown up around the Treaty itself. These
instruments, collectively known as the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), have
added to the range and variety of human activity subject to regulation and
international cooperation.26 The Antarctic Treaty itself made virtually no
reference to the environment, and appeared to specifically exclude reference
to the Southern Ocean surrounding the continent.27 Subsequent agreement
has resulted in a detailed body of international law dealing with environmental protection, human activities in Antarctica and the conservation of marine
living resources, built upon the original political compromise reached in the
Antarctic Treaty.28

25. This is still the case even with indigenous harvesting in the Arctic. Note the disturbing
scientific data on Narwhal and Beluga incorporated in a recent international commission report:
REPORT OF THE FOURTH MEETING OF THE CANADA/GREENLAND JOINT COMMISSION ON
CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT OF NARWHAL AND BELUGA, Pond Inlet, N.T., Canada, Aug.
25-27, 1994, at 2-8.
26. The term "Antarctic Treaty System" is now so firmly entrenched that it has been defined
as "the measures in effect under [the Antarctic] Treaty, its associated separate international
instruments in force and the measures in effect under those instruments." Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, Oct. 4, 1991, art. 1, 30 ILM 1455 (1991) [hereinafter
the Madrid Protocol].
27. Article VI of the Antarctic Treaty specifies the Treaty Area to be south of 600 South
latitude, but that nothing in the Treaty prejudices the rights of any state with regard to the high
seas in those latitudes. This appeared to limit the Treaty Area effectively to land and ice shelves,
reflecting the initial view of some Treaty parties. Such a view is not sustainable today. Stuart
Kaye & Donald R. Rothwell, Australia's Antarctic Maritime Claims and Boundaries, 26 OCEAN
DEV. & INT'L L. 195, 203 (1995).
28. In addition to formal treaties within the ATS, Article IX(4) of the Antarctic Treaty
permits the making of recommendations which can become binding on the Antarctic Treaty
Consultative Parties (ATCPs). The best known example is the Agreed Measures for the
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There are three instruments relevant to marine management in the
Antarctic: the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living
Resources (CCAMLR),29 the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic
Seals, 30 and the 1991 Madrid Protocol on Environmental Protection. 31 To
deal with the last first, the Madrid Protocol sets down basic principles in
relation to human activity in the Antarctic environment, including the
undertaking of environmental impact assessments 32 and the establishment of
guidelines for the disposal of waste. 3 The principles seek to preserve the
Antarctic's aesthetic and wilderness value, and indicate inter alia that activities in the Antarctic Treaty Area should avoid bringing about detrimental
changes in either the marine environment, or the distribution, abundance or
populations of species of fauna.34 The Madrid Protocol embodies a
"precautionary" approach to human endeavors in the region and as such,
theoretically impacts upon any utilization of fisheries in the Southern Ocean
south of 600 South. This impact extends only insofar as it provides a
theoretical underpinning for regulation, and does not seek to describe the
methods by which fishing is to take place or the permissible size of catches. 35 At the present time, the Protocol is not in force, but there does not
seem to be any significant opposition among Antarctic Treaty States to its
ultimate adoption. 36 Ratification is 37proceeding slowly with only sixteen of

the requisite States having done so.

The Antarctic Seal Convention is a specialized convention dealing wholly
with certain species of seal found in the area south of 60' South.38 While
it is an important step in the increasing importance environmental protection

Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora, reprinted in W.M. BUSH, I ANTARCTICA AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 146-69 (1982).
29. Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, May 20, 1980,
U.K.T.S. No. 48, 19 I.L.M. 841 (1980) [hereinafter CCAMLR].
30. Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, June 1, 1972, 29 U.S.T. 441, 1080
U.N.T.S. 175 [hereinafter Antarctic Seal Convention].
31. Madrid Protocol, supra note 26.
32. Id. Annex I.
33. Id. Annex III.
34. Id. arts. II, II.
35. A brief summary of the application of a precautionary approach to fisheries management
is found in S.M. GARCIA, THE PRECAUTIONARY APPROACH TO FISHERIES WITH REFERENCE TO

STRADDLING FISH STOCKS AND HIGHLY MIGRATORY FISH STOCKS, FAO Fisheries Circular No.

871 (1994); more generally see HARALD HOHMANN, PRECAUTIONARY LEGAL DUTIES AND
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1994).

36. The last significant opposition was overcome when the United States announced it would
sign the Protocol in July 1991. Maxwell Bruce, Epilogue, in Joe Verhoeven et al., supra note
1, at 175. See S.K.N. Blay, New Trends in the Protection of the Antarctic Environment: The
1991 Madrid Protocol, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 377, 399 (1992).
37. This has drawn some criticism from the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition
(ASOC) while monitoring the Nineteenth Antarctic Treaty Consultative Party Meeting in Seoul.
See ASOC, Press Release, May 19, 1995.
38. The Antarctic Seal Convention has the same area as the Antarctic Treaty. Antarctic Seal
Convention, supra note 30, art. 1(1).

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol26/iss1/4

6

Kaye: Legal
Approaches to Polar Fisheries Regimes: A Comparative Analys
LEGAL APPROACHES TO POLAR FISHERIES REGIMES
1995]

has come to have within the ATS, the Seal Convention is of limited utility
for two reasons. First, there is some debate as to whether it was intended to
apply to the Southern Ocean south of 600 South, or merely to the land and
ice shelves within the Treaty Area.39 Second, from a practical point of
view, the Seal Convention has been a dead letter since before it entered into
force. No commercial sealing has taken place in Antarctica for more than a
quarter of a century, and given the high costs involved in operating in so
remote a region, and the increasingly depressed and hostile state of the world
fur trade, it is extremely unlikely to ever recommence.40
B. CCAMLR-Principles& Provisions
The principal instrument relating to marine living resources is CCAMLR.
It was negotiated through the 1970s, following a resolution at the ninth
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Party (ATCP) meeting in London in September
and October of 1977,"' and a special meeting of the Consultative Parties in
1978.42 The parties were brought to the negotiating table out of a concern
that a lack of management in the past had been responsible for the wholesale
destruction of Antarctic resources.43 In the Nineteenth Century, seals were
hunted to virtual extinction on most of the sub-Antarctic Islands," and by
the 1970s the seal population still had not reached its former numbers in spite
of there having been no significant exploitation for over one hundred
years.45 Southern Ocean whale stocks had been decimated in half a century
of whaling, and in the late 1960s, huge catches of Antarctic finfish around

39. This debate focuses on interpretation of Article VI of the Antarctic Treaty. See generally
Alfred Van der Essen, The Application of the Law of the Sea to the Antarctic Continent, in
ANTARCTIC RESOURCES POLICY 231, 233 (Francisco Orrego Vicula ed., 1983); Maria Terese
Infante, The Continental Shelf of Antarctica: Legal Implications for a Regime on Mineral
Resources, in ANTARCTIC RESOURCES POLICY, supra, at 253, 255-57; Judith G. Gardam,
Management Regimes for Antarctic Marine Living Resources: An Australian Perspective, 15
MELB. U. L. REv. 279, 285 (1985); F.M. AUBURN, ANTARCTIC LAW AND POLITICS 219-20
(1982).
40. Note however reports in 1988 that the USSR had engaged in commercial sealing operations. At the review of the operation of the Seal Convention in September 1988, it was found
that there was insufficient evidence to substantiate the claims, see Anne Marchal, Conventionfor
the Conservation of Antarctic Seals: 1988 Review of Operations,25 POLAR RECORD 142 (1989);
Donald R. Rothwell, EnvironmentalRegulation in the Southern Ocean, in THE LAW OF THE SEA
IN THE ASIAN PACIFIC REGION 93, 102-03 (James Crawford & Donald R. Rothwell eds., 1995).
41. 1 BUSH, supra note 28, at 348-51. See also Resolution VIII-10 from the 1975 Oslo
ATCP meeting, where the ATCPs began to explore the possibility of a convention. 1 BUSH,
supra note 28, at 323-24.
42. BARBARA MITCHELL & RICHARD SANDBROOK, THE MANAGEMENT OF THE SOUTHERN
OCEAN 12 (1980); David Edwards & John A. Heap, Convention on the Conservationof Antarctic
Marine Living Resources: A Commentary, 20 POLAR RECORD 353, 354-56 (1981); Gardam, supra
note 39, at 293-94.
43. See KARL-HERMAN KOCK, ANTARCTIC FISH AND FISHERIES 183-89 (1992) (outlining
the brief bonanza and subsequent tragedy of the South Georgia fisheries).
44. G.E. FOGG, A HISTORY OF ANTARCTIC SCIENCE 38-40 (1992).
45. Id. at 371.
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South Georgia had been shortly followed by the collapse of these fisheries. 6
With small commercial harvesting of krill stocks beginning to increase, there
was a real fear that continued lack of regulation would lead to over-exploitation of krill. A collapse of the krill stocks, which are central to the entire
Antarctic ecosystem, would impact upon all other species in the region,
potentially destroying the ecology of the Southern Ocean. 7 Additional
incentive also came from the increasing likelihood of United Nations
involvement in regulating the Antarctic marine environment, something the
ATCP's were committed to avoiding. An ATS-based marine environmental convention was seen as infinitely preferable to a U.N.-sponsored instrument.49
Reflecting these concerns, it was the intention of the contracting parties
to adopt a very broad ecosystem-based approach to resource conservation and
this is reflected in the provisions of the CCAMLR.5 0 To begin with, the
Convention Area reflects biological realities rather than political ones. The
Antarctic Treaty area extends south of 60' South,5 an entirely arbitrary line
that bears no relation to the range or habitats of creatures in the Southern
Ocean. An environmental regime installed to conserve and manage wildlife
using 600 South as its boundary would necessarily be vulnerable, as no matter
how effectively it performed within its area of control, the potential for
unregulated abuse of Antarctic fauna north of 600 South would still exist.
The solution was to give CCAMLR boundaries that reflected ecological
realities. In the Southern Ocean, a clear divide exists where cold Antarctic
waters are subducted beneath warmer more northerly waters. This divide,
known as the Antarctic Convergence, is up to fifty miles wide, and a substantial temperature difference exists between the water in the north and that in
the south. It remains in approximately the same location each year and forms
46. KOCK, supra note 43, at 183-89.
47. See John A. Heap, Has CCAMLR Worked? Management Policies and Ecological Needs,
in THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM IN WORLD POLITICS 43, 43-49 (Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl &

Willy 0streng eds., 1991).

See also Boleslaw A. Boczek, The Protection of the Antarctic

Ecosystem: A Study in InternationalEnvironmental Law, 13 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 347, 374-

75 (1983); Edwards & Heap, supra note 42, at 354.
48. The FAO had shown an interest in regulating the Southern Ocean fisheries, but agreed
to defer to the ATCPs. Fernando Zegers, The CanberraConvention: Objectives and Political
Aspects of its Negotiation, in ANTARCTIC RESOURCES POLICY 149, 152 (Francisco Orrego Vicufta

ed., 1983).
49. Cf Matthew Howard, The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living
Resources: A Five Year-Review, 38 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 104, 111 (1989); PHILIP W. QUIGG, A

POLE APART 167-68 (1983); Zegers, supra note 48, at 152.
50. The most detailed discussion of the factors dominant in the negotiation of CCAMLR is
that of Barnes. James N. Barnes, The Emerging Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic
Marine Living Resources: An Attempt to Meet the New Realities of Resource Exploitation in the
Southern Ocean, in THE NEW NATIONALISM AND THE USE OF COMMON SPACES 239, 242-60

(Jonathan I. Charney ed., 1982).
51. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 6, art VI. It has been suggested that the Antarctic Convergence was suggested as the appropriate boundary for the Treaty Area, but was rejected as too
imprecise.

DEBORAH SHAPLEY, THE SEVENTH CONTINENT: ANTARCTICA IN A RESOURCE AGE

95 (1985).
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a natural barrier that separates Antarctic and sub-Antarctic species from fauna
in more temperate waters. Almost no creatures cross the Convergence, with
the exception of migratory whales.5" As such, it formed an obvious
boundary to delimit the ecology of the region, and Article I of CCAMLR sets
the Convention Area as being south of the Antarctic Convergence, although
specifying a deemed course53 for it, to avoid confusion. 54
The purposes of CCAMLR also stress an ecosystem-based approach.
Article II states that the objective of the Convention is conservation of
Antarctic marine living resources, and that harvesting of those resources is to
take place only in accordance with named principles. These principles are:
to ensure stable recruitment of stocks by never permitting stocks to fall below
the level that allows maximum annual increment; 55 to maintain ecological
relationships between harvested, dependent and related species and the
restoration of depleted populations; 56 and the prevention or minimization of
the risk of changes to the marine ecosystem not potentially reversible over
two or three decades.5 7
These principles differ markedly from those underlying other fisheries or
marine resource conventions.58 Instead of focusing on a single species or
class of species, the entire marine ecosystem is in issue. Further, while
recognizing that Antarctic marine resources can be harvested, they provide
that harvest cannot endanger the ecological relationships among all fauna in
the CCAMLR Area. That this would cover non-commercially exploited
species was the intention of the parties, even prior to the commencement of
formal negotiations. 59 There was a real concern during the negotiations that
what impacted upon a single species in the food chain would impact upon all
species in the chain to varying degrees, and the vulnerability that this

52. For discussions as to the nature of the Antarctic Convergence, and its impact upon sea
life, see KOCK, supra note 43, at 4-6, 33-43; Knox, supra note 18, at 22-24, 26-30.
53. There may have been some political considerations taken into account in determining
the precise course of the line, as it only approximates the path of the Antarctic Convergence.
Ronald F. Frank, The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, 13
OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 291, 302 (1983).
54. Article 1(4) deems the Antarctic Convergence to be a line joining the following points
along the various parallels and meridians: 50'S, 00; 500S, 30'E; 450S, 30*E; 45°S, 80°E; 550S,
80°E; 550S, 150'E; 60'S, 150'E; 600S, 50°W; 50'S, 50'W; 50'S, 0'. CCAMLR, supra note

29, art. 1(4). The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) has
subsequently amended its statistical boundaries in the Southern Ocean, treating the CCAMLR
separately from other ocean statistical areas.
55. CCAMLR, supra note 29, art. II(3)(a).

56. Id. art. II(3)(b).
57. Id. art. II(3)(c).
58. See WILLIAM T. BURKE, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FISHERIES 114 (1994)
(noting that CCAMLR remained the only marine living resource convention based on an
ecosystem management approach). See also Martin H. Belsky, Management of Large Marine
Ecosystems: Developing a New Rule of Customary InternationalLaw 22 SAN DIEGO L. REv.
733, 761-62 (1985); Howard, supra note 49, at 113 (noting that such an approach is used in
UNESCO's Man and the Biosphere Programme).
59. 1 BUSH, supra note 28, at 350.
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interdependency engendered required a new approach. 6' There is no reference to maximum sustainable yield, as it was recognised in the 1970s by
Antarctic scientists that this concept was of little utility in dealing with krill
due to its central position in the food chain, and was thus inconsistent with
an ecosystem-based approach.6'
CCAMLR also differs from other fisheries conventions in terms of its
membership. It is usual that participants in a fishery are the parties to a
convention, or at the very least were former participants. CCAMLR
permitted any state to sign the Convention when it was newly concluded,
regardless of its interest in exploiting the Southern Ocean.62 Subsequently,
it remained open for accession to any state interested in harvesting or
research. 63 This gives CCAMLR a membership of both states interested in
exploitation, and those primarily interested in conservation and research, and
accordingly distinguishes it from most resource management regimes.'
CCAMLR sets up a number of structures to facilitate its task of
conserving marine living resources in the Southern Ocean. First it sets up a
Commission, which is the body charged with the fulfillment of the objectives
set out in Article II. Its membership consists of each original contracting
party, and those acceding parties engaged in research or fishing interests in
the Southern Ocean.65
To meet the objectives in Article II, the Commission has a range of
powers. It can undertake research, collect and compile harvest data and
disseminate any information collected.66 More significantly, it can formulate
and revise conservation measures, 67 analyze the effectiveness of such
measures, 686 and implement a system of vessel observation and inspection.69
Conservation measures may concern such matters as the quantity of a species
that may be harvested, opening and closing of harvest seasons, regulations as
to the size and age of the catch, and the gear and methods used to bring in

60. Edwards & Heap, supra note 42, at 355-56.
61. FoGG, supra note 44, at 239.
62. CCAMLR, supra note 29, art. XXVI.
63. Id. art. XXIX(I).
64. Id. art. XXIX. A similar situation has evolved in the membership in the International
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, where a number of conservation-minded developing
states joined the International Whaling Commission (IWC) in order to influence its voting
behavior. See M.J. Peterson, Whalers, Cetologists, Environmentalists, and the International
Management of Whaling, 46 INT'L ORG. 147, 176-79 (1992).
65. CCAMLR, supra note 29, art. VII. The article also permits membership of regional
economic integration organizations, with the European Union (EU) (or European Economic
Community as it then was) firmly in mind. To date the EU is the only member of this type.
66. Id. art. IX(1)(a), (b) and (c). In part, this meets the criticism of states hostile to the
ATS that information about Antarctica is solely for the benefit of those states in the "Antarctic
Club." Howard, supra note 49, at 121.
67. CCAMLR, supra note 29, art. IX(l)(f). The conservation measures made to date are
discussed in the text accompanying notes 116-26, infra.
68. Id. art. IX(1)(e).
69. Id. art. IX(l)(g) & art. XXIV.
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the catch.7"
Decisions regarding conservation measures, or any other matter of
substance before the Commission are made by consensus.' This is consistent with other ATS measures, and effectively gives any participating state a
right of veto to any proposed measure.72 Further, in respect of conservation
measures, all states are bound to implement such measures, unless they make
use of the objection procedure set down in Article IX(6). This permits an
objection to a measure within ninety days of its promulgation, that will make
the measure non-binding on the objecting state. Other members can use such
an objection to call a meeting of the Commission to review the offending
conservation measure, and further objections to the measure can be lodged at
this meeting or within thirty days after it.73
CCAMLR contains no specific enforcement procedures to allow the
Commission to implement its measures. The closest CCAMLR comes to an
enforcement provision is Article X, which provides that the Commission can
"draw to the attention" of contracting parties or third states, matters which are
inimical to the principles of the Convention, or which adversely affect the
implementation of it. Accordingly, the only weapon at the Commission's
disposal is the embarrassment of being publicly seen as a state lacking an
environmental conscience. Enforcement is left at a national level,7" although
states also promise to ensure that no one engages in activities contrary to the
objects of CCAMLR.
The Commission is also urged to cooperate with states which exercise
their jurisdiction within the Convention Area, to ensure a consistent approach
to management.75 In addition, non-Antarctic treaty states are obliged to
comply with the Agreed Measures on the Conservation of Antarctic Flora and
Fauna,76 and to other recommendations adopted by the ATCPs.77 Further,
Article VI provides that nothing within CCAMLR is to derogate from the
rights and obligations created under the Antarctic Seals Convention and the
International Convention on the Regulation of Whaling.78 In practice, this

70. Id. art. IX(2).
71. An American proposal during the negotiations for a 2/3 majority vote was rejected. I
BUSH, supra note 28, at 413; Frank, supra note 53, at 309-10.
72. As determining what is a matter of substance is also deemed a matter of substance, it
has been expressed that states may have what amounts to a double veto, although from a practical
standpoint, one veto should prove sufficient. Boczek, supra note 47, at 377-79.
73. CCAMLR, supra note 29, art. IX(6)(b), (c) and (d).
74. Id. art. XXI(l); states are obliged to ensure enforcement of conservation measures which
are binding upon them, and to provide the Commission with data requested in relation to their
activities in the CCAMLR Area. Id art. XX. See also N.D. Bankes, Environmental Protection
in Antarctica: A Comment on the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living
Resources, 19 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 303, 315 (1981).
75. CCAMLR, supra note 29, art. XXIII.
76. Agreed Measures on the Conservation of Antarctic Flora and Fauna, June 2-13, 1965.
I BUSH, supra note 28, at 146.
77. CCAMLR, supra note 29, art. V.
78. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 161 U.N.T.S 73.
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Article has resulted in the Commission taking no steps to deal with seals or
whales in the Convention Area, although they are important component parts
of the ecosystem."
The second body set up by CCAMLR is the Scientific Committee. The
Scientific Committee was intended to provide "a forum for consultation and
cooperation concerning the collection, study and exchange of information
with respect to the marine living resources to which this Convention
applies.""0 The Committee was to provide the technical expertise and data
to permit the Commission to make determinations on conservation measures,
as well as to analyze and monitor the state of the ecosystem CCAMLR is
obliged to protect from harm."' Each party to CCAMLR was entitled to a
representative on the Committee,12 and as a whole the Committee can seek
the advice of other experts on an ad hoc basis.8 3 Other international
scientific bodies, and other Antarctic research programmes may also be
consulted or taken account of by the Committee in the course of its work. 4
The relationship of the Commission and the Scientific Committee is not
spelled out in great detail within CCAMLR."5 The Commission is clearly
the superior body, and can direct the Scientific Committee to undertake any
activities in pursuance of the objectives set down in Article 1.6 The
intention of the parties was to create a permanent scientific consultancy for
the Commission, to assist it in the complex task of implementing an
ecosystem management approach.87 Since funds provided to CCAMLR
were likely to be limited, no mechanisms were set up to provide for an
independent research capability for the Commission, so the Scientific
Committee was the next best alternative."8 It could provide a focal point for
discussion among leading scientists in the field, as well as a conduit for the
provision of high quality international advice. The link between the two
bodies is reinforced by the fact that the Commission must publish the advice
of the Scientific Committee, 9 and is expressly obliged to "take full account"

79. It seems likely this effect was the one intended by the parties when Article VI of
CCAMLR was drafted. Edwards & Heap, supra note 42, at 361.
80. CCAMLR, supra note 29, art. XV(I).
81. Id.art. XV.
82. Id.art. XIV(2); this provision ultimately was responsible for a difference of opinion
between some of the parties as to the nature of the Scientific Council.
83. Id.art. XIV(3).
84. Id.art. XV(3).
85. Ironically, the delegates at the CCAMLR negotiations spent a great deal of time debating
the relationship. Edwards & Heap, supra note 42, at 357.
86. CCAMLR, supra note 29, art. XV(2).
87. Id.art. XIV(1); see JOYNER, supra note 4, at 233.
88. Cf.Antarctic Seal Convention, supra note 30, art. V (the Antarctic Seal Convention
makes use of the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research rather than setting up its own
body).
89. CCAMLR, supra note 29, art. IX(l)(d).
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of the advice and recommendations coming from it.9°
Another unusual feature of CCAMLR is the level to which it encourages
the participation of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). Article XXIII provides that the organs of
CCAMLR will cooperate with the ATCPs and the FAO and "other SpecialIt also instructs the Commission and the Scientific
ized Agencies." 9
Committee to develop relationships with the Scientific Committee on
Antarctic Research (SCAR), the IWC, the Scientific Committee on Oceanic
Research (SCOR) and any other organisation that is considered appropriate.92 Formal agreements can be entered into, and there is provision for
observers from the organizations to be admitted to CCAMLR meetings. 93
A final point is that any state engaged in research or fishing in the
Southern Ocean might accede to CCAMLR, regardless of its status in relation
to the Antarctic Treaty. 94 As such, states which are not parties to the
Antarctic Treaty, or may not be ATCPs, may be parties to CCAMLR.
However, to preserve the political compromise that underlies the Antarctic
Treaty, all parties to CCAMLR agree to the same bifocal approach to
Antarctic sovereignty set down in Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty. 95
C. CCAMLR in Action
While few dispute the merits of the principles behind CCAMLR, some
publicists have questioned whether they can ever be effectively achieved. 96
CCAMLR has been in operation for a period in excess of ten years, and this
should be a sufficient period of time to make a reasonable assessment of its
performance.
The early efforts of CCAMLR would suggest that the fears of those
critical of its structure were justified. Until 1991, no conservation measures
were adopted in relation to krill, even though it is arguable that the protection

90. Id. art. IX(4); see Edwards & Heap, supra note 42, at 357.
91. CCAMLR, supra note 29, art. XXIII(2).
92. Id.art. XXIII(3); see Daniel Vignes, La Convention sur la Conservation de la Faune
et de la Flore Marines de l'Antarctique, 26 ANN. FR. D. INT'L 741, 756 (1980).
93. CCAMLR, supra note 29, art. XXIII(4). The provision has been utilized when ASOC,
an umbrella environmental NGO incorporating a range of NGOs with Antarctic interests, was
granted observer status in 1988.
94. Id.art. XXIX(1). That the states parties do not have to be parties to the Antarctic
Treaty is confirmed by art. III of CCAMLR.
95. G.D. Triggs, The Antarctic Treaty Regime: A Workable Compromise or a "Purgatory
of Ambiguity"?, 17 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 195, 202-03 (1985); AUBURN, supra note 39, at
221; Benedetto Conforti, TerritorialClaims in Antarctica: A Modern Way to Deal with an Old
Problem, 19 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 249, 250-51 (1986); Gardarn, supra note 39, at 285, 299;
Christopher C. Joyner, The Exclusive Economic Zone and Antarctica: The Dilemmas of NonSovereign Jurisdiction, 19 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 469, 483 (1988).
96. See Boczek, supra note 47, at 380-81; see also BURKE, supra note 58, at 114-15.
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of krill was the raison d'etre of CCAMLR in the first place.97 The use of
consensus in decision-making effectively stymied any attempts at protection
because krill-fishing states, most notably the USSR and Japan, objected to
conservation measures being imposed.98 These states pointed to the lack of
scientific data on the Southern Ocean to indicate there was no justification for
the imposition of quotas or other restrictions.9 9 The failure of consensus
was most evident in the meetings of the Scientific Committee. From the first,
there was a major difference in opinion between the USSR on the one hand,
and Britain, the United States and Australia on the other, as to the role of the
Scientific Committee. The Soviet Union saw it as a political forum, where
each state nominated a member of its own scientific community to represent
its interests.' °0 The Western States perceived the Committee as a focal
point for an epistemic community of scientists who would provide the
Commission with objective advice on the ecosystem within the CCAMLR
treaty area.' 0 ' This difference of opinion effectively stymied the work of
the Committee for some time. 2
Although the initial difficulties surrounding CCAMLR have diminished
over time, significant questions remain over the operation of CCAMLR,
mostly in relation to its ecosystem-based approach. The Commission has no
independent data gathering capability, and has been compelled to rely upon
the parties, particularly those involved in fishing, for information about the
ecosystem it has to manage. The lack of long term data on the various
fisheries, and the recurrent difficulties in the creation of an effective data
bank on marine life in the Southern Ocean are a matter of grave concern, as
a detailed data store is essential to an ecosystem-based approach.'0 3
Without being aware of the nature of all the interactions within the system,
the CCAMLR Commission is in no position to determine what measures
might be effective to fulfil its objectives. Some have argued that by its very
nature an ecosystem-based approach is impossibly complex and impractical
to achieve, and that if it cannot be successfully used in the Antarctic where

97. The first recommendation relating to krill was Conservation Measure 32/X (1991). This
applied only to krill in Area 48 (Atlantic sector). Conservation Measures 45/XI (1992) and 46/XU
(1992) extend catch limits for the area's krill which are currently being exploited within the
CCAMLR area.
98. JOYNER, supra note 4, at 234.
99. Similar arguments were made by the USSR and Japan in the 1960s when the IWC
sought to impose more stringent quotas on whaling. Steinar Andresen, Science and Politics in
the InternationalManagement of Whales, 13 MARINE POL'Y 99, 105 (1989).
100. Francisco Orrego Vicufla, The Effectiveness of the Decision-Making Machinery of
CCAMLR: An Assessment, in THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM IN WORLD POLITICs 25, 30-31

(Arnfinn
101.
102.
103.

Jorgensen-Dahl & Willy Ostreng eds., 1991).
Id. at 30-31.
Howard, supra note 49, at 117-20.
Id.at 124-28.
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the fisheries are of a relatively low intensity, it is of little utility anywhere. 0' 4
The Commission's response has been to "soft pedal" the use of the
ecosystem approach, and look at the management of individual species in
individual areas.'" 5 This has drawn criticism from Australia and New
Zealand, with the former formally expressing its disgust at the abandonment
of the principles set down in Article 1I.106 The Commission has also
evinced great reluctance to make hard decisions. The use of a consensus
decision-making system has a tendency to produce weaker measures, to
ensure that they are acceptable to all parties. An example of this is the
installation of an overall management system. It took more than four years
to reach agreement that efforts should be made to put together a complete
management system, and the final proposal was a far less substantial document than the original draft submitted to the Commission.0 7 A system of
pursuant to Article XXIV was only introduced for the 1989/90
inspection
08
season. 1
Amid all this doom and gloom, there are positive signals coming from
CCAMLR. For example, within the CCAMLR Commission there is far less
use of the objection procedure to protest conservation measures than there is
in other equivalent fisheries bodies where it is possible to use such protest to
make the measures inapplicable. The reasons for this are almost certainly
found in the use of consensus decision making procedure as opposed to
majority rule. The requirement of consensus ensures that all decisions have
achieved a level of acceptability with all parties concerned. The decisions
made may be weaker, but they are generally accepted by all, compared to
strong decisions, which may be ignored by those most affected by them. 109
Also pleasing has been the evolution of the Scientific Committee. In
contrast to the earlier years where the Committee was racked with internal
dissension, it has melded into a useful and forceful body."0 The Scientific
Committee has ultimately grown into something that resembles the original
vision. At times the Scientific Committee has prodded the Commission into
directing the Committee to use its energies towards particular research

104. See BURKE, supra note 58, at 114-15. See also MITCHELL & SANDBROOK, supra note
42, at 48 (indicating that an ecosystem model is inconsistent with seeking an optimal yield from
individual stocks).
105. See Howard, supra note 49, at 135-38; KOCK, supra note 43, at 259.

106. Closing statement to CCAMLR-IV (1985), reprintedin Howard, supra note 49, at 135.
107. Orrego Vicufia, supra note 100, at 30-3 1.
108. JOYNER, supra note 4, at 245-46.
109. An excellent example is the resolutions made by the North Atlantic Fisheries
Organization, which are often quite harsh, and consequently the subject of protest by states, most
notably the EU.
110. This would seem to be the view of Orrego Vicufla. Orrego Vicufia, supra note 100,
at 36; Joyner has also recognized that there has been a significant improvement in CCAMLR's
operation. JOYNER, supra note 4, at 238.
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tasks."' A system of working groups has been set up within the Committee, tendering advice on specific supplied terms of reference." 2 These meet
between full Committee annual events, and, in the opinion of Howard, have
proved most effective." 3 Useful links have been established with a variety
of international organizations.
At Committee and Commission levels,
connections have been made to SCAR, SCOR, FAO, IWC, the International
Oceanographic Commission (IOC) and the International Union for the
Conservation of Natural Resources (IUCN).1 4 Further, in 1988 the Commission approved observer status to an environmental NGO, the Antarctic and
Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC)." 5 Aside from increasing the range of
inputs the Commission can receive in making its decisions, this gives
CCAMLR at the very least the appearance of a wider degree of accountability
and greater legitimacy than other equivalent bodies.
There has also been a marked shift in the role of the Commission. Out
of its first seven meetings, CCAMLR succeeded in producing only 12
Conservation Measures." 6 Further, these all related to finfish stocks in the
vicinity of South Georgia that were by and large no longer commercially
viable and thus the Conservation Measures pertaining to them were uncontentious." 7 Since 1989, there have been seventy-seven Conservation Measures
created or amended--over a 600 percent increase for the same period prior
to 1989."' Further, rather than just dealing with finfish in one specific
area, the Conservation Measures cover a range of matters, including krill
throughout the Convention Area, catch data reporting systems, finfish catch
limits and restricted fisheries, sea bird protection, net mesh sizes, and
permissible by-catch levels." 9

111. Orrego Vicufta, supra note 100, at 32-33.
112. Howard, supra note 49, at 120.
113. Id.at 120.
114. Powell suggests a degree of self interest on the part of these organizations may have
helped to forge these links allowing the Commission access to their fisheries data. D.L. Powell,
Scientific and Economic ConsiderationsRelating to the Conservation of Marine Living Resources
in Antarctica, in ANTARCTIC RESOURCES POLICY 111, 112 (Francisco Orrego Vicutla ed., 1983);
see also Howard, supra note 49, at 122.
115. This occurred at CCAMLR-VII. Orrego Vicutia, supra note 100, at 35. It was not
without some difficulty that the invitation to join was finally made. A neat summary of the trials
and tribulations of ASOC's efforts to participate can be found in Howard, supra note 49, at 14648.
116. See Graph 1.
117. See KOCK, supra note 43, at 231-36.
118. See Graph 1. Joyner has the change of attitude occurring since 1987, although simply
looking at the graph, the change appears to take place two to three years later. The time of the
change is not so important as the fact that it took place. See JOYNER, supra note 4, at 238.
119. For example, Conservation Measures 32/X (1991) and 45/XI (1992) dealing with krill;
25/IX (1990), 36/X (1991) and 54/XI (1992) dealing with catch reporting systems; 38/X(1991),
491X1(1992), 67/XII (1993) and 80/XIII (1994) setting catch limits; 29/X (1991), 29XI (1993)
and 29/XIII (1994) dealing with seabird mortality; 2/III (1984) and 19/IX (1990) dealing with
net mesh sizes; and 50/XI (1992) and 68/XII (1993) dealing with by-catch limits. These are
merely examples and are by no means exhaustive of the Conservation Measures on these subjects.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol26/iss1/4

16

Kaye: LegalLEGAL
Approaches
to Polar Fisheries
Regimes:
A Comparative
APPROACHES
TO POLAR
FISHERIES
REGIMESAnalys
1995]

Two types of new Conservation Measures are worth individual discussion. First, Conservation Measure 3 1/X deals with exploratory fisheries. It
requires that States who wish to initiate activity in a fishing ground must first
notify the Commission of their intention, and accompany that notification
with scientific data on the fishery itself and on dependent and associated
species. No action in the fishery can take place until this data is provided
and the Commission has reviewed the situation, with recommendations of the
Scientific Committee. This ensures that no fishing can take place until at
least the ramifications of such action have been weighed up and discussed.
Conservation Measure 65/XII supplements 3 1/X by ensuring a high level of
monitoring and that the restriction of increased activity is maintained. If a
state fails to submit all the required data, it is automatically prohibited from
fishing in treaty waters. 20 Such stringent requirements for new fisheries
indicate a strong commitment to a precautionary approach to stock management, and ensure that the Commission can take steps even before exploitation
takes place.21

The second series of notable Conservation Measures, those dealing with
ecosystem protection, are unusual for a marine living resource convention.
The CCAMLR Commission has introduced controls that are purely interested
in protecting particular areas and species, without reference to their commercial value. It set up the CCAMLR Ecosystem Monitoring Program (CEMP)
and has implemented special site management plans in the vicinity of Cape
Shirreff on Livingston Island'22 and at Seal Islands 2 3 in the South
Shetlands, to ensure that the scientific research there goes undisturbed.
Sealing off part of a fishery just to conduct research demonstrates a strong
commitment to improving data collection within the CCAMLR area.
Similar initiative can be seen in the imposition of controls designed to
limit seabird mortality in fishing within the CCAMLR area. There has been
increasing concern that longline fishing has had a detrimental affect on
albatross populations, and a number of Conservation Measures have sought
to alleviate this problem.' 2 4 Vessels are required when conducting operations to: sink longline hooks baited with thawed bait, use a streamer line to
discourage birds, only set lines at night, and use a minimum of ship's

120. Conservation Measure 65/XII, para. 2(v) (1993).
121. These measures have been applied to an exploratory crab fishery. The United States
approached the Commission in 1991, and subsequent approval permitted harvesting. See
CCAMLR, Eleventh Meeting of the Commission, Oct. 26, 1992 - Nov. 6, 1992, at 27-28; see also
Conservation Measures 60/XI (1992), 74/XII (1993), 75/XII (1993) and 79/XI (1994).
122. See Conservation Measures 18/IX (1990) and 82/XIII (1994), as well as Resolution
11/X1II (1994) relating to the Cape Shirreff CEMP Protected Area. Resolution 11/XIII asked
members of the Commission to comply with management arrangements on a voluntary basis until
Conservation Measure 82/XIII (1994) commenced on May 1, 1995.
123. Conservation Measure 62/X (1992), building on Resolution 8/X (1991).
124. Conservation Measures 29/X (1991), modified by 29/XI (1992), 29/XII (1993) and
29/X111 (1994).
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lights. 2 ' Vessels are also prohibited from dumping trash or offal during
longline operations.' 2 6 Efforts to ensure compliance within and outside the
CCAMLR area also show that the Commission, at least in recent times, is
determined to meet its objectives set down in Article 11.127
While CCAMLR was slow to achieve a notable measure of cooperation,29
128
it seems that cooperative effort is now present.

Recent publicists

have an essential positive outlook for CCAMLR, and there are sound reasons
for this. The increasing international awareness of environmental issues, the
rise of notions of sustainable development and the precautionary principle,
and the increasing goodwill and cooperative spirit of the parties bode well for
CCAMLR. International law is coming to embrace the principles which
CCAMLR embodies, and even states hostile to the ATS are compelled to
recognize the environmental record, and the approach used within the ATS
is an example to the rest of the international community. 3
As such, if the
trend towards environmental responsibility continues, then the likelihood of
increasing cooperative effort within CCAMLR increases. This suggests an
increasing level of effectiveness for the Commission in the future.'
Cooperation and a lack of discord are all measures of success based on
function and activity, but success may also be measured on a more objective
plane. Ultimately, CCAMLR's function is to meet its objectives in conserving the Antarctic environment, and accordingly estimation of the size and
status of key Antarctic species is one way of judging the success or failure
of the regime. CCAMLR's performance can therefore be judged in relation
to the pressure upon Antarctic marine living resources and the impact of

125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Similar environmentally conscious provisions can be found in limits on mesh size,
although these have a more commercial orientation. See Conservation Measure 2/III (1984)
(pertaining to mesh sizes for various Antarctic finfish species); Conservation Measure 4/V (1986)
(pertaining to methods of determining mesh size, and to net gauge).
128. An excellent example of this comes from the discussion in relation to Conservation
Measure 55/XI (1992). There was substantial disagreement between the parties-particularly Chile
and Russia over the catch and number of vessels taking Dissostichus eleginoides. Rather than
have no measure, there was a great deal of hurried negotiation and compromise which ultimately
produced Conservation Measure 55/XI (1992). Both Chile and Russia made a point of expressly
thanking all the delegations who assisted on reaching an acceptable solution. CCAMLR, supra
note 121, at 24-26. In 1993, the limit for the catch was again reduced, without any disharmony
being evident in the decision. CCAMLR, Report of the Thirteenth Meeting of the Commission,
Oct. 26, 1994 - Nov. 4, 1994, at 26.
129. See Orrego Vicufia, supra note 100. See also Heap, supra note 47. Qualified support
also comes from EMMILIO J. SAHUIRIE, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ANTARCTICA 537 (1992).

130. This is borne out by an apparent moderation of the United Nations General Assembly's
stance toward the ATS, and its praise of the environmental safeguards introduced under it. See
Peter J. Beck, The United Nations and Antarctica, 1992: Still Searching for that Elusive
Convergence of View, 29 POLAR RECORD 313 (1993).
131. A good example of this can be seen in the statements of the Chilean delegation in 1994
at CCAMLR-XIII endorsing a precautionary approach, and noting that environmental controls
going beyond the letter of the various ATS instruments would arise in time. CCAMLR, supra
note 128, at 23-24.
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CCAMLR's conservation measures.
The principal exploited resource in the CCAMLR area is krill.' 32
CCAMLR has only sought to regulate the krill harvest since 1991, when a
catch limit of 1.5 million metric tonnes was set.' 33 Exploitation has never
approached this level, as Table I on the next page shows:

132. KOCK, supra note 43, at 191.
133. For the Atlantic sector only, Conservation Measure 32/X (1991).
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These figures merely show that the krill harvest was greater than before the
introduction of CCAMLR in 1981, and after rallying in the late-1980s, is
suffering a decline. Certainly, at no stage has the catch ever approached the
1.5 million metric tonne limit imposed by CCAMLR,1 4 and if estimates of
the krill biomass and levels of recruitment are correct, the stock is in no
danger.'3 5
Whether CCAMLR is responsible for this state of affairs is debatable.
No action by the Commission has acted as a disincentive to harvest krill,
although it is possible to say that mere existence of CCAMLR itself might be
enough. This would be supported by the sharp decline in the harvest from
1982, prior to the first meeting of the Commission,'3 6 and 1983. On the
other hand, other more credible factors might be called in to explain the lack
of growth of the krill harvest.
137
First, Russian vessels have historically taken the bulk of the catch,
and since the break-up of the Soviet Union, and the accompanying economic
dislocation, the size of the Russian fishing fleet has declined.3 3 This, in
turn, is reflected in a drop in the figures, at least since 1990. Second,
international demand for krill is limited. Except in Asia and Russia, attempts
to sell krill as food for humans have met with little success. 139 It certainly
is useful as an animal food supplement, but given the remoteness of the
waters in which it is found and the fact that krill is extremely susceptible to
spoiling soon after being caught, krill has not attracted huge fleets of
vessels."'
Most vessels fishing in the Southern Ocean for krill, at least in the 1970s
and 1980s did so as a backstop for the finfish harvest. If the finfish catch

134. Id. See also Conservation Measures 45/XI (1992) and 46/XI (1992) which breakdown
the 1.5 million tonne limit by region and sub-region.
135. This is not entirely certain, nor is even a small quota free of potential damage to other
species within the ecosystem. Krill swarming behavior means that dependent species can be
drastically affected if swarms do not form in particular areas. Note the recent dramatic effects
on the Bechervaise Island penguin colony in an area that had not seen krill harvesting for five
years. See Andrew Darby, Penguin Chicks Dying Off, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Jan. 19,
1995, at 6.
136. The CCAMLR Commission first met from May 25, 1982 to June 11, 1982 in Hobart,
Tasmania.
137. KOCK, supra note 43, at 183, 192.

138. This is most evident in the catch statistics for krill taken by Russian vessels between
1991 and 1994. In 1991, the USSR took 275,495 metric tonnes of krill, while in 1994, Russian
vessels took 965 tonnes, and Ukrainian vessels took 8,708 tonnes. CCAMLR, supra note 128,
at 26.
139. Except in Asia, where krill are considered a delicacy, there is little market for krill for
human consumption. The only large scale processing for humans was the production of a
coagulate paste made out of pulverized krill. This paste was heavily marketed in the USSR, but
suffered from quality problems depending on the size and differing grades of the krill used. E.
Budzinski et al., Possibilities of Processing and Marketing of Products Made From Antarctic

Krill, FAO FISHERIEs TECHImcAL PAPER No. 268 (FAO, Rome), 1985, at 10-13.
140. The shelf life of frozen krill at -180 C is only three months, and is difficult to process
for a variety of reasons, including its size, quality variability, and loss of nutrients during the
peeling process. Id. at 6-11.
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was good, they did not go after krill, whereas if it was poor, costs could be
offset by a good krill catch. 4' In fact, the variability of the Soviet finfish
catch between 1982 and 1983, and difficulties in krill processing are a more
realistic explanation for the changes in size of the krill harvest in the early to
mid-1980s.42
It may be possible therefore to get a better idea of CCAMLR's effectiveness from the statistics on finfish in its area. These species have been the
subject of the bulk of CCAMLR's conservation measures, and evidence as to
the state of the fishery may be useful to determine the success or failure of
CCAMLR management.
Several species of finfish have been commercially exploited in Southern
Ocean waters, including the marbled rockcod (Notothenia rossii) and the
mackerel icefish (Champsocephalus gunnari).143 Vast quantities of these
stocks were taken in the early to mid-1970s, and their decline can be
dramatically illustrated in Graphs II and III.
The first Conservation Measures introduced by CCAMLR were directed
essentially at these fisheries, in the vicinity of South Georgia in the South
Atlantic Ocean. 4 ' To the present time, these fisheries are still not capable
of serious commercial fishing.'45 Does this mean CCAMLR has failed?
Realistically, it would seem unfair to lay all of the blame for the
destruction of most of the Antarctic finfish stocks upon CCAMLR. The
Convention came into force in 1981, by which time the destruction of most
of the species had been completed. Although CCAMLR's early record of
cooperative endeavor was poor, the first Conservation Measures introduced
went some way to try to restore these stocks.' 46 Later Conservation Measures have sought not merely to try to permit the fisheries to restore
themselves by closure of areas, but also have imposed stringent by-catch
controls in areas where other species are fished, to ensure that the biomass of
the depleted fisheries is not further reduced. 41 7 The stocks have not recovered since their depletion, but it is difficult to see what more CCAMLR could
do, although certainly more could have been done sooner.
A better estimate of CCAMLR's finfish performance might be to look at
its treatment of a viable Antarctic finfish fishery. Only one commercial

141. KOCK, supra note 43, at 189-91.
142. J.-C. Hureau & W. Slosarczyk, Exploitation and Conservationof Antarctic Fishes and
Recent Ichthyological Research in the Southern Ocean, in FISHES OF THE SOUTHERN OCEAN 52,
59 (0. Gon & P.C. Heemstra eds., 1990).
143. KOCK, supra note 43, at 183-201.
144. Conservation Measures 1/II (1984), 3/IV (1985), 7N (1986), 8NI (1987), 9NI (1987)
and lONI (1987).
145. Karl-Herman Kock, Fishing and Conservation in Southern Waters, 30 POLAR RECORD

3, 15 (1994).
146. Id; see also Conservation Measures 5N (1986) and 6N (1986) which imposed species
fishing bans around the South Orkneys and Antarctic Peninsula.
147. See Conservation Measures 38/X (1991), 50/XI (1992), 68/XII (1993) and 85/XIII
(1994).
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species of Antarctic finfish was not destroyed in the years prior to CCAMLR,
the Antarctic Lanternfish (Electronacarlsbergi). In CCAMLR's early years,
catches of E. carlsbergidid not exceed 2,500 tonnes. However in 1988, this
48
jumped to approximately 15,000 tonnes, and in 1989 to 30,000 tonnes.
In spite of reports of a biomass of in excess of 1.7 million tonnes, and a
dearth of additional information concerning the fishery, 149 Conservation
Measure 38/X (1991) was adopted by the Commission, setting a limit of
245,000 tonnes.' 50 This was coupled with stringent by-catch requirements,
More encouraging was
and additional measures regarding data reporting.'
the response of the Commission in 1993, to the continuing lack of data.
Rather than maintain the total allowable catch (TAC) at the same level, it
adopted a "precautionary TAC" of 200,000 tonnes because "in the continuing
absence of any information on the biomass and biological characteristics of
the stock ... it was no longer acceptable for this stock to continue to set
TACs in line with assessments that were several years old. '5 The catch
in 1992 had amounted to some 47,000 tonnes,"' and there was no evidence
to suggest the stock was in decline. Yet CCAMLR applied a precautionary
approach, to ensure that the chances of damage were minimized based on
what data was known. This strongly suggests a genuine commitment on the
part of the parties to effective conservation of Antarctic fisheries, and a desire
to preserve, rather than 54to step in after the disaster and nurse destroyed
fisheries back to health.
II. THE ARCTIC
A. Introduction
Within the Arctic, there is no all-encompassing instrument like CCAMLR
which deals with the whole Arctic marine ecosystem, or even with a single
species for the whole region. From a geopolitical point of view, this is not
surprising, given that the fisheries are widely separated from each other by
permanent ice and continental land masses, and significant portions of the

148. FAO, supra note 133a, at 265.
149. KOCK, supra note 43, at 233.

150. The substantive provisions in Conservation Measure 38/X (1991) were re-enacted in
Conservation Measure 53/XI (1992).
151. Conservation Measures 39/X (1991) and 40/X (1991).
152. CCAMLR, Report of the Twelfth Meeting of the Commission, Oct. 25, 1993 - Nov. 5,
1993, at 27.
153. FAO, supra note 133a, at 265.
154. This is also borne out in the statement of the Chilean delegation to the Commission
at CCAMLR-XIII, which stressed common responsibility and a precautionary approach to
management. CCAMLR, supra note 128, at 23.
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fisheries in question fall under the undisputed jurisdiction of individual
states. "55
'
Individual states are generally reluctant to share management
responsibility of stocks within their exclusive economic zones (EEZs), for
obvious reasons, and usually do so only where some common interest
presents them with an overarching compulsion to create an international
arrangement. This is the essence of "regime formation" within regime theory
in political science: that states only form regimes where they perceive that
their interests would be best served by cooperative arrangements, rather than
confrontation. Since a state will generally see little utility in cooperating in
the management of a resource entirely within its care and control, such
regimes rarely form. 5 6 When coupled with the political antagonism
between East and West during the 1980s, and the strategic importance of the
Arctic, it is not surprising that the number and scope of fisheries regimes that
exist are relatively modest.5 7
Nevertheless, a number of fisheries arrangements operate (or attempt to
operate) in Arctic waters, and are appropriate for comparison with CCAMLR.
For the purposes of a useful case study, it is appropriate to consider the area
that effects what was, until recently, the most significant Arctic fishery-the
Bering Sea. The Bering Sea also has the distinction of being the site of the
most recent attempt at international fisheries management, so it is a most
suitable site for comparison.
B. Bering Sea-Background
The Bering Sea is part of the North Pacific Ocean, and by some
definitions would not even be considered Arctic.'58 It is linked to the
Arctic Ocean by the narrow Bering Strait, and is delimited by the coasts of
Alaska in the east, Siberia in the west, and in the south by the Aleutian

155. The most significant fisheries in the Arctic are in the Bering Sea (largely within the
U.S. and Russian EEZs), the Greenland Sea (Iceland and Greenland), the Norwegian Sea
(Norway and Iceland) and the Barents Sea (Norway and Russia). Smaller scale fisheries are
exploited in the Baffin Bay and Davis Strait regions (Canada and Greenland).
156. For general discussions on the nature of regime theory and formation see M. List &
V. Rittberger, Regime Theory and International Environmental Management, in THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT 85 (Andrew Hurrell & Benedict Kingsbury eds., 1992);
ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: BUILDING REGIMES FOR NATURAL RESOURCES
AND THE ENVIRONMENT

(1989); Gail Osherenko & Oran R. Young, The Formation of

InternationalRegimes: Hypotheses and Cases, in
ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES I

POLAR POLITICS: CREATING INTERNATIONAL

(Oran R. Young & Gail Osherenko eds., 1993).

157. Those multilateral conventions which have been concluded include sub-Arctic fisheries
as only part of their areas. Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest
Atlantic Fisheries, Oct. 24, 1978, Sen. Exec. Doc. T, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1979), Cmnd.
7569; Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the North-East Atlantic, Nov. 18, 1980,
1285 U.N.T.S. 129, OJ 1980, L 227, 22; International Convention between the United States of
America, Canada and Japan for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean, May 9,
1952, 205 U.N.T.S. 65 (defunct since February 1993).
158. Parts of the Bering Sea are south of 60' North, well south of the Arctic Circle.
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Islands.'
It has an area of 2.274 million square kilometers, approximately
ten percent of which are high seas. 6 A number of publicists have identified it as a semi-enclosed sea, within the definition encapsulated in Part IX
of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, and there does not seem to be any
serious dispute with such a conclusion. 6 '
Before the 1980s, the Bering Sea was an important fishery, particularly
for Japan. 6 2 The United States only claimed a three mile territorial sea,
and the Soviet Union asserted a twelve mile territorial sea, leaving the fishery
virtually unregulated. 63 Important stocks included pollock, herring, halibut
and salmon, 16 1 particularly the first and the last of these. Efforts to bring
pollock and other groundfish stocks under international management (as had
been done for salmon) under the North Pacific High Seas Fisheries Convention 65 were unsuccessful, but fishing did not reach levels sufficient to
collapse the fishery.'6 6
Changes occurred in the 1980s, with the declaration of 200-nautical-mile
zones by the USSR 67 and the United States. 6 The United States began
to pursue a policy of exclusion of foreign fishing vessels from its EEZ, and

159. See Map II.
160. Jeffrey L. Canfield, Recent Developments in Bering Sea Fisheries Conservation and
Management, 24 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 257, 258 (1993); Lewis M. Alexander, Regionalism
and the Law of the Sea: The Case of Semi-Enclosed Seas, 2 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 151, 158
(1974).
161. For example, see Alexander, supra note 160, at 158, 168; Lorene Miovski, Solutions
in the Convention on the Law of the Sea to the Problem of Overfishing in the Central Bering
Sea: Analysis of the Convention, Highlighting the Provisions ConcerningFisheriesand Enclosed
and Semi-Enclosed Seas, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 525 (1989).
162. See Meltzer, supra note 23, at 283-84.
163. The United States did have a 200-mile fishing zone in 1977, but permitted access by
other States. Id.
164. As an anadromous stock, North Pacific salmon ought to be considered separately, and
given that they spawn in rivers in the continental United States, Canada and eastern Siberia, they
cannot truly be considered Arctic in character. In addition, different provisions of the Law of
the Sea Convention relate to their exploitation, strengthening the need for a distinction to be
drawn. For these reasons they will not be considered here. Regional management of salmon
falls under the International Convention on Conservation and Management of Anadromous Fish
Resources in the wider North Pacific Region. See Artemy A. Saquirian, Russia and Some
Pending Law of the Sea Issues in the North Pacific: Controversies over Higher Seas Fisheries
Regulation and Delimitation of Marine Spaces, 23 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 1, 3-4 (1992).
165. International Convention between the United States of America, Canada and Japan for
the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean, May 9, 1952, 205 U.N.T.S. 65 [hereinafter
INPFC Convention].
166. The INPFC Convention was effectively terminated by the withdrawal of the United
States in February 1993. The Convention installed to replace it only deals with salmon.
Canfield, supra note 160, 266-67.
167. DECREE OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR ON THE ECONOMIC
ZONE OF THE USSR - 28 February 1984, reprintedin ROBERT W. SMITH, EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC
ZONE CLAIMS: AN ANALYSIS AND PRIMARY DOCUMENTS 417-18 (1986).

168. Proclamation No. 5030, March 10, 1983, 22 I.L.M. 461 (1983). The United States had
instituted a fishing zone in 1977.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1995

25

California
Western International
Journal, Vol. 26,
No. 1JOURNAL
[1995], Art. 4
100
CALIFORNIA
WESTERN Law
INTERNATIONAL
LAW
[Vol. 26

this was to have important consequences for the region.' 69 Although the
Bering Sea is semi-enclosed, the central area is more than 200 nautical miles
from land, leaving a large oval-shaped zone of high seas unofficially known
as the "Doughnut Hole."' 70 Once excluded from the U.S. EEZ, the foreign
fishing fleets from Japan, South Korea and Poland shifted their Bering Sea
operations to the Doughnut Hole, where they were free to fish without
regulation. '
The change in practice can be seen dramatically when comparing levels
of exploitation of fish in the Doughnut Hole before and after the advent of
EEZs in the region. In 1980, 15,000 metric tonnes of pollock were harvested. "72
' In 1985, this had grown to 363,000 metric tonnes, rising to 1,040,000 tonnes in 1986 and 1,448,000 tonnes in 1989. 73 While the figures may
be distorted by the Doughnut Hole being used as a base for illegal pollock
raids on the U.S. EEZ, 7 4 it is clear there was a vast and dramatic shift in
fishing practices in the Bering Sea.
The sudden rise in the catches in the Bering Sea was a source of some
concern for scientists. Miovski notes that in 1988, at a time when catch
levels were still rising, scientists from the states fishing in the Doughnut Hole
met at Sitka to discuss the state of the pollock stock.'7 5 The meeting
voiced fears that overfishing was taking place, and called for expanded
research in the region and a coordinated international programme for fishery
exploitation. 7 6 The calls of the scientific community went unheeded. In
1989, the catch for the Doughnut Hole reached a record high, and by 1992
the stock had completely collapsed.' 77
C. Doughnut Hole Convention
International efforts to regulate the fishery began in earnest only when
it was apparent the stock was under threat. Meetings began in Washington
D.C. in 1991, initiated by the two coastal states, the United States and

169. The exclusion of foreign fishing vessels was phased in over a number of years.
Edward L. Miles & David L. Fluharty, US. Interests in the North Pacific, 22 OCEAN DEV. &
INT'L L. 315, 318 (1991).

170. See Map II.
171. Edward L. Miles & William T. Burke, Pressures on the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea of 1982 Arising from New Fisheries Conflicts: The Problem of Straddling
Stocks, 20 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 343, 348-49 (1989).

172. Miovski, supra note 161, at 527.
173. Meltzer, supra note 23, at 286.
174. Fisheries authorities in the United States are of the view that foreign vessels operating
in the Doughnut Hole stray into the U.S. EEZ, although what impact that has on the statistics
is difficult to quantify. Canfield, supra note 160, at 260-61.
175. Miovski, supra note 161, at 528-29.
176. Id.
177. Meltzer, supra note 23, at 286.
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Russia.'78 In addition to these two states, delegations from China, Japan,
South Korea and Poland participated as distant water fishing nations
(DWFNs). It is a measure of the importance of the issue that subsequent
conferences were held at six-monthly intervals.' 7 9 Little effective progress
was made as there was a fundamental difference of opinion between the
coastal states, who wanted a moratorium or a fixed cap to fishing in the
Doughnut Hole, to operate in conjunction with their EEZ management
systems. The DWFNs objected on the basis that management or a moratorium would deprive them of catches whereas the coastal States could continue
Such an argument has some
to fish the region from within their EEZs.'
force when the size of the catches within the U.S. and Russian EEZs are
compared to that of the Doughnut Hole.
TABLE II

Pollock Catch in the Bering Sea
(figures in thousands of metric tonnes)'.'

YeaiIIIiIi

1981

[1982

11983

[1984 11985]1

US EEZ

958

974

956

982

1099

1179

Russian EEZ

928

891

1019

971

756

662

Doughnut Hole

18

0

4

71

182

363

Year

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

US EEZ

1189

1237

1228

1230

1315

1364

Russian EEZ

867

812

1327

1029

814

504

Doughnut Hole

1040

1326

1397

1448

918

293

178.
179.
180.
181.

Cf Miles & Fluharty, supra note 169, at 323-25.
Canfield, supra note 160, at 269-70.
Id.at 269-70.
Adapted from Meltzer, supra note 23, at 286.
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The disappearance of the pollock in 1992 finally brought progress to the
negotiations. At the fifth conference, the parties finally agreed to an interim
moratorium on fishing in the Doughnut Hole in 1993.112 This moratorium
was extended at subsequent conferences for 1994 and 1995, while negotiations toward a more permanent management regime took place.' 8 3 This was
finally achieved in June 1994 with the conclusion of the Convention on the
Conservation and Management of Pollock Resources in the Central Bering
Sea. 184
The Doughnut Hole Convention applies to the Bering Sea beyond the
EEZ of any State, so it is confined to the Hole alone. 8 5 It also states
among its objectives the conservation, management and optimum utilization
of the pollock stock.' 86 It also aims to restore the stock to levels which will
permit the maximum sustainable yield. 8 7 The only concession made to a
wider approach to management comes in Article 11(4) which allows the
parties, if they agree, to establish necessary conservation and management
measures for marine living resources other than pollock within the Doughnut
Hole. '
These objectives evidence a traditional "issue specific" approach to
fisheries management, which neatly demonstrates the exact scope of the
problem facing the parties. The regime deals with no more than the specific
difficulty currently affecting the states concerned. There is only the sentiment
expressed in Article 11(4), that if the parties agree they may talk about the
regulation of other species within the Doughnut Hole, otherwise the
Convention shies away from any reference to the inter-relationship of marine
species or to the pollock and other creatures that are within the EEZs of
Russia and the United States. The reference to maximum sustainable yield
in determining the acceptable level of pollock biomass confirms the
conservative nature of the Convention.18 9
Administration of the Doughnut Hole will be by an Annual Conference
of the Parties, with the assistance of a Scientific and Technical Committee. 90 The Annual Conference has the task of determining the annual

182. W.V. Dunlap, Bering Sea-The Donut Hole Agreement, 10 INT'L J. MARINE &
COASTAL L. 114, 116 (1995); e.g., Canfield, supra note 160, at 270-71.
183. Canfield, supra note 160, at 271.

184. Convention on the Conservation and Management of Pollock Resources in the Central
Bering Sea, June 16, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 67 (1985), reprintedin 10 INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL
L. 127-34 (1995) [hereinafter the Doughnut Hole Convention].
185. Id. art. I.
186. Id. art. 11(l).
187. Id. art. 11(2).
188. Article 11(4) states that one of the objectives of the Convention shall be: "to provide,

if the Parties agree, a forum in which to consider the establishment of necessary conservation and
management measures for living marine resources other than pollock in the Convention Area as

may be required in the future."

Id. art 11(4).

189. Id. art. 11(2).
190. Id. art. III(l).
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harvest level for pollock (AHL)' 9' and the quotas for each fishing State
(INQ), 19 2 as well as the task of formulating other conservation and management measures for pollock that are deemed necessary.'93 It may also inter
alia, discuss methods of cooperative enforcement.9 4 and fishery support
operations in the Doughnut Hole, 95 direct the Scientific and Technical
Committee's "Plan of Work,"' 96 "consider" other conservation matters
relating to species other than pollock, 97 and any other matters necessary to
meet the Convention's objectives.'9 8
Decisions of the Annual Conference are to be made by consensus on all
matters of substance, and the nature of any issue is itself a matter of
substance.' 99 Each year the Conference will convene in the territory of one
of the parties, and based on reports of the Scientific and Technical Committee, will determine the AHL for the following year, and the INQ for each party.211 In the event a consensus solution cannot be reached, the Convention
sets up mandatory procedures to determine the AHL,2 ° ' and guidelines for
the allocation of INQs.2 °2 Observers are permitted, if unanimously accepted
by the parties at conferences, but only if they are the representatives of a nonparty State.2"3 There would seem to be no scope for the participation of
NGOs or international organizations.20 4
The Scientific and Technical Committee will draw its membership from
the participating States which are each entitled to at least one member. 0 5
The reference to at least one member seems to suggest that States might
nominate a number of members if necessary, although there also appears to
be a strong presumption of equality among the states. The Scientific and
Technical Committee's task is to act as a conduit through which national

191. Doughnut Hole Convention, supra note 184, art. IV(I)(a).
192. Id.art. IV(I)(b).
193. Id. art. IV(I)(c).
194. Id. art. IV(I)(g).
195. Id.art. IV(1)(f).
196. Id.art. IV(1)(d).
197. Id.art. IV(1)(i).
198. Id.art. IV(1)(m).
199. Id. art. V(2).
200. Id. arts. VI-VIII.
201. Id. art. VII(2) & Annex pt. 1. The procedure involves the calculation of the pollock
biomass by American and Russian institutions, based on data provided by the Scientific and
Technical Committee. Once a biomass has been determined, the AHL is dependent on the size
of the biomass-with no fishing to take place if the total stock is less than 1.67 million tonnes.
202. Id. art. VIII(2) & Annex pt. 2. Rather than a mandatory procedure, Part 2 of the
Annex specifies factors to be taken into account in the creation of a management system. These
include the recommendations of the Scientific and Technical Committee, the scope, level and
efficiency of each state's fishing effort; the opportunity for all parties to fish, and appropriate
monitoring and conservation procedures.
203. Id.art. XII(5).
204. Id.
205. Id.art. IX(I).
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pollock research can be channelled and filtered to the Annual Conference, as
well as to undertake specific tasks and work allocated to it by the Conference.2" 6 The need to make the regime as cost-effective as possible was
responsible for the adoption of an Annual Conference rather than a permanent
secretariat,20 7 thus it may be considered unlikely the Scientific and Technical Committee will develop its own independent research capability in the
foreseeable future. The Committee is to report to the Annual Conference,
making recommendations in relation to the exploitation of pollock, including
the AHL for the preceding year.208 Such recommendations ought to be by
consensus, where it is attainable, and with all views recorded in the report
where it is not.20 9
Enforcement is both flag-state and cooperative. First, each State
undertakes to ensure compliance with the Convention and any conservation
measures made under it. 2'0 This includes permitting fishing in the Doughnut Hole by only expressly authorized vessels, 2" the fitting of each vessel
with satellite location transmitters,21 2 notification of entry into the Hole and
of transhipments of fish out of the Hole. 213 All data collected on fish
catches and vessel locations must be exchanged between the parties at regular
intervals, and in the case of the latter, on a real-time basis. 2 4 All vessels
are to carry trained observers, with a preference for non-flag-state observers
where possible. 21" Their task is to monitor the implementation of conservation and management measures and to report to the vessel's flag state and
their own state.2t6
All states parties consent to the boarding and inspection of their vessels
in the Doughnut Hole by officials of the other parties.21 7 If a violation is
found, the flag state is to be informed, and is obliged to order its vessel to
cease the violations, and if necessary, to leave the Doughnut Hole.218 If the
violation involves fishing beyond allowable limits or an unauthorized
excursion into the Doughnut Hole and the flag state cannot immediately meet
its obligation, the boarding of the vessel may continue until the flag state can
take over. 219 This means, in effect, that an arrest can be made by any

206.
207.
208.
209.

Id. arts. IX, X.
Dunlap, supra note 182, 117 n.20.
Doughnut Hole Convention, supra note 184, art. IX(4).
Id. art. IX(I)-(4).

210. Id. art. XI(1).

211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id. art. XI(2).
Id. art. XI(3)(a).
Id. art. XI(3)(b) & (c).
The intervals are to be set by the Annual Conference. Id. art. XI(4).
Id. art. XI(5).
Id. art. XI(5)(e).
Id. art. XI(6)(a).

218. Id. art. XI(7).

219. Id. art. XI(7)(b).
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party, although in effect the arrest is made on behalf of the flag state. All
offences are to be tried in the flag state's courts under domestic law, with
penalties reflecting the seriousness of infractions.22 ° To prevent circumvention of the law by the use of flags-of-convenience, the parties are obliged to
"'
pass legislation to prevent the transfer of registration for that purpose.22
The Doughnut Hole Convention's attitude to third party states is worthy
of comment. Third party states are to have their attention drawn (by the
states parties) to activities of their nationals or vessels that might hinder the
attainment of the Doughnut Hole Convention's objectives and are to be
encouraged to respect the provisions of the Convention and the measures
taken pursuant to it.222 This is not much different from the language of a
number of fisheries conventions, including CCAMLR,223 but Article XII(3)
of the Doughnut Hole Convention goes further. The parties agree to take
measures individually or collectively, consistent with international law, to
deter a third party state from activities that adversely affect the attainment of
the Convention's objectives.224 This could encompass a range of measures,
including refusal of port access, the imposition of tariffs against the third
party state's fish and possibly other forms of more radical economic
retaliation.225
It might be argued that if Canada's actions against Spanish fishing on the
Grand Banks in March 1995226 subsequently receive sanction from the
International Court of Justice or the international community, that similar
action could be taken in the Doughnut Hole under the language of Article
XII(3). If the third state whose nationals or vessels are fishing in the
Doughnut Hole is amenable to joining the Convention, the present parties
may unanimously invite the third state to join.227
It is difficult to give an effective assessment of the Doughnut Hole
Convention in action, as the agreement itself has only just begun to come into
operation. The first Annual Conference was held in Seattle in November

220. Id. art. XI(7)(c) & (d).
221. Id. art. XII(4).
222. Id.art. XII.
223. Compare CCAMLR, supra note 29, art. X (directing the Commission to draw the
matter to the attention of third states) with CCAMLR, art. XXII(1) (hinting at stronger action,
subject only to the United Nations Charter).
224. Doughnut Hole Convention, supra note 184, art. XII(2).
225. Such measures could be akin to those under the Fishery Conservationand Management
Act of 1976 (Magnuson Act) 16 U.S.C. § 1801 (1994); see B. Martin Tsamenyi, The Treaty on
Fisheriesbetween the Governments of Certain South Pacific Island States and the Government
of the United States of America: The Final Chapter in United States Tuna Policy, 15 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 183, 193.
226. In March 1995, Canada unilaterally enacted legislation to prohibit Spanish and
Portuguese vessels from fishing for turbot on the Grand Banks of Newfoundland, beyond the
Canadian EEZ. The resulting dispute between the EU and Canada saw trawler nets cut, warning
shots fired and the arrest of a Spanish vessel on the high seas before it was resolved.
227. Doughnut Hole Convention, supra note 184, art. XVI(4).
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1995,22 so the various mechanisms under the Convention have yet to be
tested. However, it is possible to draw from the history of agreements with
similar provisions on the chances of there being no further over-exploitation
of the stock and effective cooperation between the parties.229
At present, cooperation between the parties is high-the stock has
collapsed and it is in the interests of all that it be rebuilt to commercial levels.
However, regulation only extends as far as the Convention to the Doughnut
Hole itself. While urging a moratorium inside the Hole, there is nothing to
stop the United States and Russia from continuing to fish in their EEZs.
Scientific evidence suggests a link between the Doughnut Hole stock and
those in the EEZs, particularly to the Bogoslof Island area within the U.S.
Zone.230 Continued fishing by the two coastal states may jeopardize the
recovery of the Doughnut Hole stock, and act to prejudice the DWFNs from
cooperation. This situation could well be exacerbated in the event the
Doughnut Hole stock rebuilds, as quotas might be depressed by overfishing
from within the EEZ areas.
There is also a close geographical precedent to suggest that cooperation
vanishes if a stock has not failed. The Sea of Okhotsk "Peanut Hole," a
small area of high seas entirely surrounded by the Russian EEZ, is currently
fished by vessels from Poland and China, and recently South Korea and
Japan. 2 1' Although Russian scientists have said present levels of fishing
threaten the viability of stocks in the region, neither China nor Poland has
proved amenable to negotiation-in spite of the lessons of the Bering Sea,
and the fact that all of the affected states are parties to the Doughnut Hole
Convention.232 Given the Doughnut Hole's history prior to the collapse of
the stock, and the current situation with many of the same players in the Sea
of Okhotsk, the success of the Doughnut Hole Convention appears somewhat
problematic should the pollock ever recover.
III. COMPARISONS
There are a number of points of comparison between CCAMLR and the
Doughnut Hole Convention. First, although there are differences in the scale
of the harvests, there is a great deal of similarity between the nature of the
catches in the Arctic and the Antarctic. Both pollock and krill are central

228. E.g., Dunlap, supra note 182, at 117.
229. These range from the outright and ongoing hostility between some of the parties to the
North Atlantic Fisheries Convention, to the degree of goodwill presently existing between the
parties to CCAMLR.
230. Canfield notes that eighty percent of Doughnut Hole pollock come from the Bogoslof
area. Canfield, supra note 160, at 261.

231. Meltzer, supra note 23, at 290-91.
232. Cf id. at 290-93; A.G. Oude Elferink, Fisheriesin the Sea of Okhotsk High Seas Enclave-The Russian Federation's Attempts at Coastal State Control, 10 INT'L J. MARINE &

COASTAL L. 1 (1995).
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organisms in very limited and narrow ecosystems,233 whose depredation
could have significant impacts upon other fauna. The pollock and krill
harvests produce relatively little in the way of by-catch, and are remarkably
"clean" compared to more temperate fisheries.2 34 Both regions have seen
major damage done to marine living resources through over exploitation of
Antarctic finfish and pollock.
There are also elements of similarity between the two regimes under
consideration. Both operate on consensus as the basis for decision-making,
giving each of the parties an effective veto. Both seek to encourage the
effectiveness of the regime through the encouragement of third party states
to comply with its provisions. Both are closed to new members save by
invitation of all the states concerned. Both take the advice of a scientific
committee, through whom data pertaining to the state of the fisheries is
evaluated.
Yet these similarities are superficial, and they mark points in common
between fundamental differences in attitude and approach. These differences
are most starkly portrayed in the objectives of the two regimes. CCAMLR's
objectives are to institute an ecosystem management system, and a precautionary approach to intervention in the Antarctic environment. The Doughnut
Hole Convention's objective is the exploitation of the maximum sustainable
yield of pollock. There is no reference to precaution in the Convention, in
spite of its conclusion in 1994, and the totality of the Arctic ecosystem is
scarcely paid lip service.
The reasons for the differences can be found in political rather than
ecological reality. In the Antarctic, a history of close apolitical cooperation
founded in scientific endeavor exists. The Antarctic Treaty grew out of a
desire to depoliticize the continent, and perpetuate the goodwill engendered
between scientists during the International Geophysical Year (IGY) in 195758.235 As part of the ATS, CCAMLR had more than two decades of
fruitful interaction on which to build.
In the Arctic, the political situation is reversed. There was a great deal
of antagonism between Russia and the United States in the years between the
end of the Second World War and the collapse of the USSR. As the
maritime area where the two superpowers directly faced off, the Bering Sea
was an important theater of any potential conflict. This alone was sufficient
to stifle most attempts at Arctic regional cooperation. Even when the
strategic tensions between the two coastal states in the Bering Sea were
233. The central positions of pollock and particularly krill are shown in the discussions and
food web diagrams of Ainley and De Master. D.G. Ainley & D.P. De Master, The Upper
Trophic Levels in Polar Marine Ecosystems, in POLAR OCEANOGRAPHY: CHEMISTRY, BIOLOGY,
AND GEOLOGY 599, 602-09 (Walker 0. Smith ed., 1990).
234. In spite of this, note Conservation Measures 38/X (1991), 50/XI (1992), 68/XII (1993)
and 85/XIII (1994), all of which impose strict by-catch limits on particular fisheries.
235. The scientific cooperation seen in the Antarctic during the IGY is usually viewed as
one of the significant factors in the negotiation of the Antarctic Treaty. Cf AUBURN, supra note
39, at 104.
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sufficiently diminished to permit effective discussion of management of the
Bering Sea, the DWFNs involved had their own interests and agenda which
hampered efforts at a solution. The actual formation of a regime required an
environmental disaster that practically destroyed all parties' interests before
national self-interest was perceived to be best served by negotiation.
This background suggests that levels of cooperation in the Antarctic are
likely to be much higher than in the Arctic, and accordingly the regime has
a greater chance of functioning effectively. That such cooperation is possible
cannot solely be ascribed to the depoliticization of Antarctica by Article IV
of the Antarctic Treaty. Political disputes and even military action concerning territory within the CCAMLR area have not prevented meaningful
dialogue and joint responses to problems. Britain and Argentina dispute the
sovereignty over South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, and there
was fighting on South Georgia (including the destruction of an Argentinean
submarine) in 1982.236 Publicists have often made much of the demilitarization of the Antarctic, noting that the Antarctic Treaty forbids military
action south of 600 South, and the fact that both Argentina and Britain
respected that provision. 7 No such provision required their compliance for
South Georgia or the South Sandwiches, as both states assert 200-nauticalmile zones around the islands. 3 In spite of actual hostilities, and unwavering claims, both Britain and Argentina have taken joint action, within
CCAMLR, to ensure that the fisheries around the islands, which are far and
away the most important in the Southern Ocean, are adequately protected.2 3 9
Thus to suggest that Arctic cooperation on fisheries is impossible due to the
geopolitical situation in the region is perhaps an underestimation of what can
be achieved.
It is submitted that the most significant difference between the Arctic and
the Antarctic is to be found in the influence of epistemic communities in the
negotiation of the regimes, and the continuing impact of these communities
over time. In the Antarctic, the SCAR has over thirty years experience in
consulting with ATCPs on environmental and scientific issues. 24 ° Even
before the CCAMLR negotiations, SCAR had determined the necessity of
constructing multi-species models of the Antarctic marine ecosystem as part

236. MARTIN MIDDLEBROOK, THE FIGHT FOR THE 'MALVINAS'

72 (1989).

237. The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 6, art. I(1).
238. Argentina: Act No.23.268 of 14 August 1991 (as part of the EEZ of metropolitan
Argentina); Britain: PROCLAMATION (MARITIME ZONE) No. 1 of 1993, reprintedin South Georgia
and the South Sandwich Islands Gazette, May 7, 1993.

239. Naturally both reject the other party's position on sovereignty. Cooperation has taken

place in setting up a South Atlantic Fisheries Commission in 1989, and with a joint statement
on May 7, 1993, after Britain had declared an EEZ around South Georgia and the South
Sandwich Islands. See Meltzer, supra note 23, at 277-78.

240. SCAR's role is perceived to be most important in the provision of scientific advice to
the ATCPs. Its membership consists of scientists from states engaged in scientific research in
the Antarctic. MITCHELL & SANDBROOK, supra note 42, at 9.
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of the BIOMASS program.2 4' The Antarctic Treaty itself arose out of
scientific cooperation in the 1950s, and individual states have maintained this
link in a number of ways. The people most likely to have Antarctic expertise
are former expeditioners, who are almost invariably scientists. These experts
are found administering Antarctic departments within ATCPs, and consequently they exert a significant impact on Antarctic policy. 242 The objec-

tives of CCAMLR reflect a scientist's views of how environmental management should take place-there is a recognition of the complex relationships
within the environment; that actions that impact upon one element affect the
other elements to varying degrees. The institutional structure of CCAMLR
with its Scientific Committee also fosters the epistemic connections, and has
led to a situation where the ATCPs were prepared to consent to the
participation of scientific and environmental NGOs within the CCAMLR
processes.
The Doughnut Hole Convention has a similar Scientific and Technical
Committee within its organizational structure, but there is nothing to suggest
there is an influential epistemic community utilizing the structure. The
Doughnut Hole Convention objectives reflect the national fishing lobbies'
desire for the greatest return of fish possible. Even though there are serious
scientific doubts over the efficacy of maximum sustainable yield243 and its
compatibility with international environmental law's movement toward a
precautionary approach,244 it is still within the text of the Doughnut Hole
Convention. There is no scope for participation, outside of the directly
affected states, for NGOs, and there is no encouragement to establish links
with scientific or other bodies. Further, calls by scientists in 1988 to prevent
collapse of the stock were ignored, 245 and the stocks ultimately collapsed
as feared.
From the above, it would be easy to suggest that the Doughnut Hole
Convention is doomed to fail, and CCAMLR is a raging success. Such a
suggestion would not be accurate. The Doughnut Hole Convention, although
conservative and vulnerable to disagreement between the parties, is a step in
the right direction. Certainly it is infinitely preferable to the complete lack
of regulation that existed before. The tragedy in its creation is that it took the
complete destruction of a vast and valuable resource to give rise to the
conditions that brought it into existence. In the Antarctic, similar tragedies
took place years before, and CCAMLR was a conscious effort to prevent a
more dreadful recurrence. The greater strength of the international Antarctic
scientific community allowed CCAMLR to appear sooner, and be given an

241. Id. at 52-53.
242. For example, at least six delegations to the ATCP in Kyoto in 1993 were headed by
individuals with scientific backgrounds, and no more than three did not have an individual with
such a background in their delegations.
243. See supra text accompanying note 61.
244. See supra text accompanying note 34-35.
245. See supra text accompanying notes 175-77.
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objective more in keeping with the desire to conserve.
CCAMLR has not entirely succeeded in its objectives for a number of
reasons--chiefly linked to the paucity of the CCAMLR Commission's resources and the attendant difficulties in setting up a database that can permit
ecosystem management to become a reality. However, each year the database
grows and the possibility of true ecosystem management comes closer. Some
publicists have doubted whether such an objective is possible at all; that the
natural environment is too complex a system to permit such totally encompassing management. This may prove to be so, but the polar environments
provide us with the most simple ecological systems anywhere on the planet,
and if ecosystem management can ever be achieved, it can be achieved in
these places. If cooperation within CCAMLR remains solid, then the
possibility of the regime functioning as an effective model for other marine
living resource regimes remains real. The time may not yet be ripe, but it
may be approaching.
What should make greater cooperation possible in the Arctic is the fact
that there is a significant overlap of the protagonists in both regions-Russia,
Japan, Norway, Poland and the United States are major players in both the
South and the North. European Union states, particularly Britain and
Germany, also have growing interests in the Arctic and the Antarctic. What
is it that prevents cooperation on fisheries?
Ultimately what stifles the cooperation in the Arctic is sovereignty. In
the Antarctic, the political environment is "sovereignty-neutral." Claimant
states in Antarctica could and have claimed EEZs for their territory, but most
fishing states would simply ignore them. A cooperative regime was the only
effective way to protect the resources. In the Arctic, EEZs are claimed by
coastal states, and recognised by fishing states. Rather than dilute sovereignty, a coastal state will seek to manage areas within its EEZ itself, largely
without reference to adjacent EEZs or high seas, or the Arctic ecosystem as
a whole.246
In short, to establish an ecosystem-based approach to fisheries management in the Arctic, it will be necessary for coastal states to accept some
diminution of their jurisdictional control over Arctic waters within 200 miles
of their territory. The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy may be the
precursor of such cooperative change, but at present it seems far off. Until
it occurs, the two systems existing at each end of the globe will remain as
different as they are remote from each other-each providing alternative
models for regional fisheries management for the world.

246. Such a conclusion is confirmed by the virtual absence of regional cooperation in the
Arctic in the area of marine living resources (a notable exception being the Agreement on the
Conservation of Polar Bears, Nov. 15, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 3918, 13 I.L.M. 13 (1974)), the lack of
cooperation within an organization like NAFO which potentially could play a role in Arctic
fisheries management, and the jurisdictional limits of the Doughnut Hole Convention itself.
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Map 1
(reprinted from Kock, supra note 43, at 214)

Fig. 66. CCAMLR Statistical Areas, Subareas and Divisions.
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Graph I
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Graphs II & II1
(reprinted from Kock, supra note 43, at 186)
(a)Nominal catch by species around South Georgia (FAO Statistical Subarea
48.3) from 1969/70 to 1989/90 (Anon. 1990ac).
(b) Nominal catch by species around the South Orkney Islands (FAO
Statistical Subarea 48.2) from 1977/78 to 1989/90 (anon., 1990ac).
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Map H
(reprinted from Dunlap, supra note 182, at 115)
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